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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
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Programme on Eastern Europe
The Working Paper series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European Union 
in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of attention. The 
scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two areas of research 
have been prioritized:
1/ The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe 
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre’s Programme, as 
well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute.
This paper was written for a meeting of the Reflection Group on the Long-Term 
Implications of Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: the Nature of the 
New Border, set up jointly by the Robert Schuman Centre and the Forward 
Studies Unit of the European Commission, and chaired by Professor Giuliano 
Amato. The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre are 
not responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author. For 
information on this and other projects on Eastern Europe at the Robert Schuman 






















































































































































































According to a recent journalistic truism, the Iron Curtain that was dismantled in 
1989 as a political and ideological frontier has since reemerged as an economic 
and social border. Schengenland protects itself from its Eastern neighbors with 
the help of import quotas and visa obligation, police buildup along the border and 
a blend of diplomatic arrogance and precaution. The truism is based on the 
identification of the new “police frontier” with a social border, more exactly, with 
a welfare cascade that ranges from the former Iron Curtain to Siberia. In the light 
of this assumption, the Iron Curtain remained a border beyond which social 
exclusion, human deprivation, poverty and criminality prevail. Probably, East- 
Central Europe can be still salvaged but the farther you move to the East, the 
more severe social crisis you find. Because this contradicts established European 
values, and -  perhaps, more importantly -  because of the need for protecting 
Western markets after Osterweiterung, one of the elementary requirements of the 
entrance examination to the European Union the ex-communist countries should 
meet is a quick and steady increase in their social performance levels.
As frustrating as it may be for Eastern Europeans, it is impossible to make 
this truism about the rich and poor halves of Europe questionable in the field of 
general social statistics. Of course, one could doubt its inherent geographical 
determinism (is Georgia socially more backward than Albania?) or point out 
those fields of social policy (e.g., family allowances), in which the shrinking 
..communist welfare state,, still provides more generous services than many of its 
advanced Western counterparts. Also, a thorough comparison of the general 
social performance of, for example, the Czech Republic and Hungary today with 
that of Greece or Portugal at the time of their accession to the European 
Community may reveal striking differences in development in favor of the ex- 
communist countries.
In this chapter I would like to cast doubts on the social border thesis from 
another perspective. The proponents of that thesis usually confuse performance 
indicators with regime characteristics and attribute poor performance to a 
particular welfare regime. This regime is frequently portrayed as a hybrid 
consisting of the relics of communist social policy and of a neophyte imitation of 
the US model of welfare. According to the implicit assumption, almost an axiom, 
Eastern Europe took resolute steps toward “Americanizing” its welfare regimes. 
The related accusation is, however, explicit: the ex-communist countries are 
committing a grave mistake by abandoning the “European tradition” in social 
policy and thereby preserving the Western frontier of the former Eastern Bloc as 



























































































of two possible worlds, welfare provided by incompetent and corrupt state 
bureaucrats with social myopia of the free market.
In what comes below I will try to show that:
1) New poverty, social exclusion, etc. in Eastern Europe is, to a large 
degree, a result of post-’89 economic recession. “Neoliberal” arguments 
are frequently used by local policy-makers to make virtue out of the 
necessity of introducing austerity measures in the economy. At any rate, in 
most countries of the region any “Americanization” of the welfare regimes 
has remained a rhetorical excercise rather than a powerful economic 
startegy.
2) The considerable drop in general social performance also represents 
a kind of “back to normalcy” process whereby the levels of welfare 
provision have been adjusted to the actual economic capacity of the new 
democracies during the first years of the transformation. Nevertheless, path 
dependency is strong, and, surpassing the stage of austerity, the ex- 
communist welfare states tend to recover in many fields and even radically 
liberal/communitarian reforms end with compromise and stalemate in the 
social sector.
3) As a consequence, while the fact of a social border cannot be 
disputed in real terms (though the gap between East and West is being 
reduced by the economic upswing in East-Central Europe), it would be 
difficult to identify that border as a demarcation line which also separates 
two essentially different types of welfare regime. Although occasionally, 
Eastern European social reformers may make bolder experiments than their 
West-European colleagues in marketizing/privatizing certain welfare 
schemes, a.) these experiments are far from being irresistible under the 
pressure of the social legacies of communism, the daily challenges of the 
transformation and the requirements of European integration; b.) similar 
reforms have been initiated (also with mixed results) by a few West- 
European welfare states as well. Hence, a clear separation of regime types 
would be impossible even if they proved to be homogeneous on both sides 
of the former Iron Curtain. Given their heterogeneity in the West as well as 
in the East, the “border of models” may run, in a certain field of welfare 
and at a certain moment, between Great-Britain and Hungary on the one 
side and Germany and the Czech Republic on the other.
In crossing the real borders between the former Blocs in Europe in any direction, 
the traveller becomes a prisoner of new differential stereotypes of welfare such as 
“solidaristic versus socially irresponsible”, “organized versus chaotic”, etc., 
which complement the old one of “rich versus poor”. These are based, in a way 




























































































abandoned children, street beggars and tuberculosis patients or the measure of air 
pollution, the size of average old-age pension or the frequency of work accidents. 
However, if social policy analysts indulge in the preservation and multiplication 
of these indicators, they run the risk of elevating their differences onto a symbolic 
(almost mythical) level. To be sure, drawing symbolic borders which separate 
“us” and “them”, the “same” and the “other” in a strict moral hierarchy can easily 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy; a prophecy that may inhibit social innovation 
by exerting enormous pressure on the “unlucky” Eastern half of the continent to 
imitate the “lucky” Western one even if the latter represents only one of the 
successful development types in global context and its success has recently been 
questioned both from in- and outside.
If catching up with Europe is confined to sheer imitation, Eastern Europe 
may remain unlucky. By the time it copies any of the current welfare regimes of 
Western Europe, these regimes will not have probably been able to produce the 
same performance levels as they do today. While the European Union adjusts to 
the global competition of tomorrow (let us hope it will), the accession countries 
may adapt their social systems to those of the Union of yesterday and today and, 
as a result, may lag behind the world again. Therefore, the newcomers have to 
undertake the almost impossible task of satisfying the today’s conditions of 
entrance while preparing for those of tomorrow. Given the long building process, 
and later, the considerable inertia, of welfare institutions, Eastern European social 
reformers have no other choice than trying to have the entrance examiners of the 
Union accepted such welfare policies in the ex-communist states, which the same 
examiners would not yet put forward in their own countries. If the European 
Union is to tame global pressures among others in the social sectors, the 
accession countries are exposed to the changing proportions between “global” 
(which is not simply American) and “European” in the Union.
Disturbing Questions
The term “premature welfare state of communism” coined by Janos Komai some 
time ago is widely discussed in East-Central Europe (ECE) today. Dedicated 
followers of ffee-market orthodoxy and nostalgic communists are making efforts 
to interpret the metaphor of the early-born baby according to their own 
preferences. While the former opt for active euthanasia, i.e., they would like to 
accelerate the death of the struggling baby, the latter try to keep the incubator 
working even if the baby has died. Between the two extremes represented by a 
few radicals there is an overwhelming majority of social scientists and policy­
makers with diverse convictions who would be happy to find a viable 




























































































Indeed, can the communist welfare regimes be transformed without falling 
into the trap of (a) conserving the statist, inefficient and pseudo-egalitarian 
character of the old system of social policy; (b) seeking new forms of welfare 
collectivism along the nationalist/populist “Third Roads” between capitalism and 
communism; (c) triggering popular discontent by dismantling the old welfare 
regimes too rapidly, in a haphazard way; and (d) targeting an end-state which has 
become unsustainable in the Western world during the past two decades?
These fairly disturbing questions become extremely annoying if one 
considers that the transformation of the communist social institutions and policies 
takes place in fragile new democracies, under the pressure of an unprecedented 
economic recession, amidst repeated privatization and marketization drives, in 
economies which have recently and vehemently opened up to global competition 
and are challenged by the vision of a near-term enlargement of the European 
Union. One can no longer disregard the related question: “to what extent are the 
emerging welfare regimes in East-Central Europe not only sustainable but also 
compatible with the European model(s)?”
In answering this question, one can hardly apply the convenient method of 
fixing, in a way or another, the European standards of social policy and examine 
to what degree the newcomers have approached it. The emerging welfare regimes 
in East-Central Europe are far from being identical and there has always been a 
variety of social policy models in Western Europe. In addition, the ECE experts 
do not find stable institutional arrangements in the West to copy but rather 
another reform process, the “domestication” of the classical welfare state(s). 
True, the general trends are not dissimilar: partial retrenchment, decentralization, 
marketization and privatization of public welfare services as well as an upsurge of 
the voluntary sector, that is, decreasing state involvement, are the main 
characteristic features of regulating welfare on both sides of the former Iron 
Curtain. Nevertheless, to tell if the two changing systems are likely ever to be 
harmonized is terribly difficult. Who would be willing to predict today whether or 
not in ten or fifteen years from now the post-communist welfare regimes will be 
compatible with the European standards of that time?
Theoretically, if one excludes the unlikely case of spontaneous perfect 
harmonization, where East-Central Europe catches up Western Europe without 
overtaking it in any respect, there may be two kinds of incompatibility. Despite 
any similarity of the two reform processes, either the Western or the Eastern part 
of Europe will happen to become in the long run less statist and more private 
(andVor “voluntary”) than the other in terms of the welfare mix. To put it simply, 
either the EU or the ex-communist social regimes become more “North- 




























































































Currently, there is a growing consensus in the West about social 
trajectories in the ECE region. Unfortunately, this consensus has been forged 
under the influence of spectacular media images of societal polarization in 
Eastern Europe as a whole (e.g., Russian new-rich women in fur coats shopping 
in Paris versus children dying in a demolished AIDS clinic in Romania). Not only 
journalists but also many Western scholars assert that ex-communist countries are 
in a rush to jump over first the Scandinavian model of social protection, then the 
Bismarckian, the Beveridge-style and the South-European welfare systems to 
arrive in the world of US-type social regimes. If this is true, one should be 
prepared for the ironic situation, in which certain countries of the region will 
prove to be EU-incompatible in the future not because they are still too 
communist-bound but because they are excessively pro-capitalist.
For a long time, common wisdom was the following: East-Central Europe 
should be allowed to join the European Union only after a protracted phase of 
adaptation because of among other reasons its poor social performance in 
absolute terms. If the pro-capitalist -  many observers will say, neoliberal -  
experiments succeed, while the similar West-European reforms slow down or get 
stuck (horribile dictu, if Europe creates a “social fortress”), will these 
experiments not constitute an obstacle as well?
The Dialogue of the Deaf
It was with these questions that I have tortured my colleagues, labor and social 
policy experts in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, since 1992, 
the year in which we launched the SOCO (Social Consequences of the Economic 
Transformation in East-Central Europe) program at the Vienna Institute for 
Human Sciences. During the past eight years, I have assisted the birth of many 
dozen research projects and a large empirical survey within the framework of this 
program, attended workshops and conferences, edited volumes on the 
transformation of the communist social systems but have not become a veritable 
expert of welfare theory or policy.1 I remained a student of current economic and 
political thought in Eastern Europe who is interested in the reemergence of the 
“social question” in the region, and in the ways local social scientists and policy­
makers cope with the problem of imitation versus invention in designing welfare 
transformation programs.
To tell the truth, the intellectual attraction did not seem too great in the 
beginning. In exploring the social policy discipline in the region, one finds oneself 
on a battlefield with political mines lurking everywhere and antagonists frequently 




























































































camouflages the empirical facts of the underlying social processes and the 
research techniques applied to understand these facts.
By and large, the cast of the battle consists of liberal-minded economists 
on the one side and sociologists with social-democratic leanings on the other. The 
roots of their conflict reach back to the period of reforms under late communism, 
during which they drifted into a “state versus market” debate of a rather 
scholastic nature. At that time, the pro-market economists (market socialists, as 
they were called) asked the social policy experts to prove that their 
interventionist, social-protectionist claims (a reaction, by the way, to the falling 
welfare performance of the planned economy) were different from those made by 
the communist hard-liners. The sociologists felt offended by this accusation and 
responded to it with a counter-attack by simultaneously alluding to the “laissez 
faire fundamentalism” of the market socialists and refuting state dirigism. It is not 
by chance, they said, that from time to time the communist governments are ready 
to accept “social-darwinist” programs suggested by the “marketeers”: this shows 
the common Bolshevik (i.e., inhuman, dictatorial) roots of the advisor and the 
advisee. It may well be that the conflict started the other way round and 
sometimes intersected the disciplinary frontiers. However, one thing was certain. 
The unfolding controversy reminded the observer of a dialogue of the deaf, in 
which mutual recrimination concerning social indifference of economists versus 
economic ignorance of sociologists frequently replaced reasonable arguments.
The conflict between the two groups, which had partly been repressed by 
their internal solidarity against the communists, erupted in 1989 causing huge 
waves of emotion all over the region. It should have originally revolved around 
day-to-day problems of crisis management (e.g., what kind of welfare 
services/expenditures could or should be reshaped, curtailed or deleted to reduce 
the overall budget deficit in the short run). Instead, it was elevated onto the level 
of social philosophy. Here “state” and “market” as such were confronted again: 
the sociologists stressed how expensive the market is in terms of social costs and 
downplayed government failures while the economists argued the other way 
round instead of comparing the social costs and social benefits of both institutions 
in a detailed analysis.
On the eve of the Eastern European revolutions, most of the social policy 
experts hoped that in the future there would be enough room for a kind of “sound 
interventionism”.2 They would not have to face incompetent, arrogant and pitiless 
state bureaucracies any longer; the welfare programs could be reconstructed to 
become more just and efficient at the same time; and certain welfare schemes 
would be managed by the civil society on a non-profit basis rather than 




























































































“communist welfare state” should be dismantled, they believed, but the welfare 
state must be preserved or -  more exactly -  created anew following Scandinavian 
rather than any other Western European patterns, not to mention North America.
Now imagine this group of welfare reformers who in 1989 found 
themselves confronted with a great number of economists in their countries who 
eagerly wanted to launch strict stabilization programs, which were complemented 
by ambitious plans for marketization and privatization. Moreover, these 
economists were supported by an influential choir of foreign advisors, Western 
policy-makers and leaders of international economic organizations. Occasionally, 
they applied a rather low-quality neoliberal rhetoric to justify austerity. This mix 
of restrictive vigor, deregulation drive and neoliberal rhetoric prevailing in the 
first years of the post-communist transformation came as a real culture shock for 
the welfare reformers of East-Central Europe. As a first reaction they fell back on 
a routine language and continued demonizing the former economic reformers 
(now transformers) as “Chicago Boys”, “Wild-East Thatcherites”, etc., who 
represent the same kind of social indifference as before -  now as agents of an 
“international neoliberal conspiracy”. To substantiate this theory it was enough to 
look around and see old beggars, child prostitutes and depressed unemployed in 
the streets, as well as closed kindergartens, encroaching slums and crumbling 
hospitals throughout the region. “This is Latin-America. You are responsible!”, 
pointed the social policy expert at the economic transformer. “Do you long for 
the ancien régime!”, so went the response, and the dialogue of the deaf 
continued. Incubator or euthanasia?
Did Anything Happen?
Two and a Half Narratives
Today, the antagonists are probably less strained and determined. Economic 
recession is over in Hungary and Poland, and the recent austerity measures in the 
Czech Republic were relatively unsevere. Many of the major steps toward 
welfare transformation ended with a compromise or were postponed. The welfare 
sectors display considerable inertia and neither the rhetoric nor the actual 
programs of the post-communist governments vary greatly. “New social 
democracy” in the West also offers the warriors a sufficient dose of relativism 
and pragmatism to bury their hatchets.
As regards the scientific environment of social transformation, hundreds of 
new research projects are underway; the involvement of Western scholars of a 
variety of persuasion result in more sophisticated techniques of survey and 




























































































normative fervor is counterbalanced by detached explanation; interdisciplinary 
research is ascendant and rival tendencies appear within the individual 
disciplines. Consequently, ten years after the Revolution, one may hope that the 
bilateral conflict described above will be moderated by cross-cutting the cleavage 
with the help of new insights, which mediate between the dominant discourses or 
transcend them for good.
Nevertheless, before the bright future materializes, it would not be too bad 
to know what has “really” happened in the welfare sectors of East-Central 
Europe in the course of the past decade. Given the still rather passionate moods 
in social sciences throughout the region and the lack of comprehensive and 
comparative works3, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the most recent history 
of welfare in the ECE states. Let us first see how the “insiders” interpret the 
course of this history. Below I will focus on three (more exactly, two and a half) 
competing narratives of welfare development: for the sake of brevity, they will be 
named the “leaping in the dark”, the “marking time” and the “muddling 
through” stories. All of them have something to say about the point of departure 
of post-communist welfare transformation, the process of transformation itself 
and its probable destination.
In what follows, I will first try to retell those two stories that originate in 
the conflict between economic and social reformers. Then the main lines of a 
third, experimental “half-narrative” will be drawn. Finally, I will briefly discuss 
how the “what has happened” question relates to the problem of EU 
compatibility.
Needless to say, the narratives are my constructions and they are probably 
sharper than many of the authors (“Easterners” and “Westerners” alike) to whom 
I refer as representatives of the given discourse would like to see. If not stated 
otherwise, what comes below is their text in a stylized form, though some of the 
references include authors who share only one or two conclusions of the given 
narrative. Three countries of East-Central Europe -  the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland -  are chosen as backgrounds to the stories. The examples pertain to 
quite a few important fields of social welfare with the clear exception of 
education. The narratives are reconstructed around two main topics: the general 
performance and the institutional design (mix) of the welfare regimes. The 
quantitative information, on which the individual narratives are based is to be 





























































































According to this narrative, since 1989 a fundamental -  and appalling -  change 
has taken place in the region concerning both the performance and the 
institutional character of the welfare systems.4 Following some years of 
stagnation, public provisions have been drastically reduced (a) by narrowing the 
scope and the period of eligibility entitlements (sick pay, unemployment benefits, 
family allowances, pensions, etc.), that is, by partly abandoning universalism for 
targeted transfer payments, (b) by fixing the statutory minimum wages or 
pensions too low and linking certain benefits to it; (c) by lowering the quality 
standards of the services; (d) by introducing the principle of private insurance 
(health care, old-age pensions) or (e) simply by inflating away the real value of 
the government transfers (pensions, family allowances, etc.). With the 
privatization of state enterprises a vast number of health clinics, kindergartens, 
apartments and holiday homes, i.e., a considerable share of public welfare 
provision disappeared almost overnight.5 The remaining social services became 
more expensive through curbing or terminating the government subsidies, 
establishing co-payment schemes (day care, medicine, hospital treatment, etc.) 
and taxing certain transfers. Also, public expenditure on welfare has not grown 
through decentralization:6 although the local administration units get relatively 
more funds now than before, but the sum total of local and central expenditures 
on social services was not increased.
What is emerging is a new (more exactly, old) paradigm, a kind of a 
“liberal” or “residual welfare state” as Gosta Esping-Andersen or Richard 
Titmuss described it.7 Communism left behind a “serviced heavy, transfer light” 
welfare system8, which is being transformed into one that provides significantly 
less services while not increasing the government transfers proportionally (or 
indeed also decreasing them). After world war II, the communists in East-Central 
Europe had inherited Bismarckian style social arrangements; while expanding and 
deepening them, they reinforced the statist-hierarchical components of these 
arrangements. When communism collapsed, the baby was thrown out with the 
bath water: instead of democratizing9 and partly liberalizing public welfare in 
moving toward the Scandinavian models or at least toward Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft, i.e., instead of keeping the “Western” features of the social 
system and throwing away “Eastem”-type pseudo-paternalism, the essentials of 
state-financed and state-provided welfare were made questionable.10 This is 
retrenchment11, nothing else. Yet, the state cannot be replaced in some of its 
social policy functions (organizing redistribution on the national level, granting 
social rights, etc.) and the welfare sectors, if left alone, suffer from a series of 
market failures. The state is not to be venerated but used carefully.




























































































Following 1989, most economic transformers named welfare the main 
culprit of the alleged public overspending. Obviously, expenditures also could 
have been cut back in other chapters of the state budget. Nevertheless, the post­
communist governments exploited austerity to “educate” the citizens12 (for short­
term savings (e.g., consumption of medicines) and long-term calculating behavior 
(e.g., private pensions)) by forcing them to accept the amorphous and overlapping 
principles of individual responsibility, self-reliance and self-insurance. Originally, 
the cutbacks were said to be provisional but they got built into the new welfare 
mix. The education strategy was skillfully based on the fact that communism had 
immensely discredited the ideals of equality and solidarity as well as of state 
intervention in general. The local educators and their Western advisors were even 
more zealous and met less resistance in the ECE countries than in the West, and 
their references to austerity and economic rationality often disguised the vested 
interests of certain lobbies, sheer ideological commitment and/or lack of 
expertise. Moreover, because the subject of individual responsibility was loosely 
defined, the principle of self-reliance offered the new governments a legitimate 
opportunity to shift part of the social burdens (child care) onto the families. Here 
neoliberal arguments prepared the soil for conservative solutions which forced 
women to leave the workplace and return home.
Undoubtedly, the “communist welfare state” had safeguarded the 
principles of universal coverage and free services only on paper13. Yet, if the 
transformers violate them each and every day, and, in addition, they touch on 
both taboos with the pride of a doctrinaire, then nothing can stop the transition 
countries on their way leading to the slums of Rio de Janeiro. Health service is 
the horror example throughout the region. Although social security contributions 
have not been reduced, one should pay dearly for a bed in hospital. But in order 
to be operated in time, one should still bribe the doctor, like under the old regime, 
to jump the queue. If one really wants to heal, it is highly recommended to bring 
along toilet paper, food and medicine to the hospital, not to mention a well- 
trained relative who would replace the nurse. In the optimal case, the Soros 
Foundation will have equipped the hospital with high-tech machinery, there will 
be only a few well-to-do people (including foreigners) standing in line and, 
following the surgery, one will not get a bad cold lying near a broken window.
Besides abandoning universalism and the principle of free services, there 
was another symbolic gesture of utmost importance. The doctrine of statutory 
social/positive rights (such as the right to work) was practically renounced by 
avoiding any definition of the object, the extent and the institutional setting of 
public welfare responsibility in the new constitutions of the region. The authors of 
these basic laws did their best to formulate the state’s responsibility for social 




























































































communism, these rights were not enforceable because democracy was 
suspended; today, paradoxically, it is democratic parliaments that hinder their 
concretization.
The social spheres that were evacuated by the state have not been refdled 
by private (non-profit or for-profit) initiative. The mushrooming of non­
governmental welfare organizations in East-Central Europe must not mislead the 
observer. They are either low capacity/quality substitutes for public services or 
favor the rich; they serve tax evasion purposes and expropriate public money or 
charge exorbitant prices or -  and that is the most likely case -  die fast. Private 
health insurance and pension schemes, the two major “innovations” of the new, 
mandatorily-mixed welfare in the region, are probably less efficient than the 
system of publicly financed and state-managed social security and certainly more 
unjust and risky. The privately funded schemes privilege the already privileged. 
In the case of the pension system, for instance, the private/public combination 
favors those with middle and high incomes and secure jobs who have not retired 
yet.15 In other words, the principle of individual responsibility prefers the strong 
to the weak. Thereby, even partial privatization of financing health care and the 
pension system confuses most links of solidarity between generations and social 
strata and contribute to the growth of income inequalities and eventually to the 
disintegration of the fabric of the society. The emerging welfare mix is getting 
increasingly biased toward the middle class (the actual voters and taxpayers), 
particularly toward its upper echelons. This process is defended by means of the 
utopia of an unlimited downward expansion of the middle strata of society. At the 
same time, the rich are allowed/prompted to opt out from certain public welfare 
schemes, which makes them irresponsible for the functioning of the whole social 
system.
Welfare policy degenerates into poor relief with social assistance and 
workfare becoming the main instruments of social protection. The “truly needy”, 
the “deserving poor”, must undergo humiliating and expensive means-testing 
procedures and may long for the non-existent charity offered by the new elite. 
Meanwhile, whole groups (disabled, homeless, long-term unemployed, elderly 
with low pensions, large families, ethnic minorities, chronically ill, inhabitants of 
declining regions, etc.) fall through the ever growing holes of the safety net. New 
forms of social exclusion and deprivation (mass unemployment, child poverty, 
malnutrition, prostitution, etc.) are generously tolerated by the state; deep poverty 
has become legitimate again; and excessive polarization between an ever growing 
underclass and a thin layer of the new rich is even applauded. At any rate, the 
widespread use of the metaphor of “social safety net” 16 reflects the cynical 
attitude of the transformers: one should not offer each citizen a protecting rope or 




























































































enough for the society to prepare for the case if some of them (those who tried to 
perform but could not) fall down; the others, the “undeserving poor”, may fall 
through the net.17
As a result of the general social decay, in East-Central Europe most socio- 
biological indicators ranging from life expectancy at birth to the frequency of old 
and new diseases deteriorate sharply. On the average, people have less children, 
become sick more often and die younger, and while being alive, are poorer and 
enjoy less social safety. Owing to the neoliberal course of the transformation, the 
region has lost altogether hundreds of thousands of human lives.18 A good part of 
them might have been saved if the transformers had shown courage in real 
invention instead of merely copying ambiguous social arrangements such as the 
Chilean pension schemes. For instance, the fresh start in 1989 would have 
provided an excellent opportunity for the new social policy makers to introduce a 
basic income regulation in the ECE countries to prevent the escalation of 
poverty.19 However, they preferred the revitalization of old stigmas to enacting 
new citizenship rights for the needy.
What about the new challenges for the declining ECE social systems, 
which go beyond the standard tasks of transition to capitalism? The “communist 
welfare states” were more or less able to cope with the social consequences of 
global competition and communication (migration, drug trafficking and 
international crime in general) until they managed to close their borders with 
police forces and non-convertible currencies. These, of course, led to huge 
welfare losses in other fields. However, their successors do not even make 
attempts at taking the new challenges seriously. Today, welfare policy-makers of 
the region tend to delegate the new social troubles to the sphere of responsibility 
of the young and weak ngo sector. Moreover, instead of designing major public 
assistance programs for migrants and launching long-term prevention and 
rehabilitation initiatives for drug addicts, they build new fences at certain frontiers 
and increase punishment norms.20
With some decentralization of public welfare administration and the 
development of Janus-faced non-govemmental organizations, social citizenship 
under post-communism has reached its pinnacle in terms of democratic rights. 
Irrespective of their political colors and the will of their voters, governments in 
East-Central Europe tend to implement an aggressively neoliberal course of 
economic transformation. As a consequence, the only institutions which remained 
to represent the welfare interests of the citizens are the labor unions. However, 
they have never had strong (or -  in the case of Poland -  lost much of their) 
popular support, could not manage to stabilize their relations with the new social- 




























































































and exposed to the malevolence of the legislators. Hence the citizenry, 
fragmented as it is, has to passively assist the fundamental deterioration of its 
own welfare situation. Meanwhile, as substantiated by a series of opinion polls 
and deeper sociological surveys, the same citizenry would prefer Swedish-type 
(publicly guaranteed) safety to (privately owned) freedom if they were asked by 
their own parliamentary representatives.21
What has happened is indeed a leaping in the dark both figuratively and 
literally. The region has jumped into uncertainty and exposed itself to the “dark 
forces” -  call them as you please: global capitalism, monetarist dictatorship or 
international economic organizations.22 Although the proponents of this “Great 
Leap Backward” are firmly convinced that, in jumping over Europe, North- 
America will be the ideal final destination, in the end they will inevitably arrive 
not in the Northern but the Southern part of that continent. The welfare regime of 
the US without the strength of its economy and the community ethos of its 
citizens leads nowhere else. In any event, in leaving behind communism and 
hoping to have the opportunity to join a “social Europe”, that is, a whole new 
civilization that combines safety with freedom on the highest possible level, it 
would be almost as frustrating to every person with social conscience as the Latin 
America option if he had to reconcile himself with the philosophy of the US-type 
quasi-welfare state.
Finally, those who in East-Central Europe insist on the concept of 
minimum state in welfare transformation run the risk that a coalition of 
nationalists and unreconstructed communists expropriate the idea of social 
protection. Thus, in trying to minimize “welfare waste”, the neoliberal 
transformers may generate the largest social costs by jeopardizing the new 
democracies.23
Marking Time
This story is based on a deep frustration contrasting the disillusionment of the 
previous narrators. According to this response to the “what has happened” 
question, the really appalling development is that there is no development: East- 
Central Europe has not yet been able to leave behind the “communist welfare 
state”. The region is still marking time at the start line. It is far from heading 
toward Latin America but may eventually arrive there if it continues to insist on 
the utopia of providing welfare irrespective of the actual economic conditions of 
the post-communist transformation. It is not the alleged “neoliberal haughtiness” 





























































































Let us suppose for a moment that a permanent and general decay of 
welfare has really occured in the ECE countries both in terms of the performance 
and the style of the social system. Even if this assumption were correct, one ought 
to ask oneself, say the narrators of this story, whether the allegedly 
comprehensive deterioration
1) is a clear consequence of liberal transformative policies or has much 
deeper roots stretching into the ancien régime. If the latter is true, one is 
dealing with an optical illusion: at least part of the decay did not happen 
after 1989, it only became visible in the new democracies (poverty, 
unemployment, etc.). It may also be that in certain fields the transformation 
has even slowed down the deterioration of social performance in the region 
that had begun back under communism. And conversely, what decay is 
currently visible (due to the lobbying power of certain groups such as 
pensioners or medical doctors) is not necessarily the greatest hardship24.
2) is characteristic of all ex-communist countries or primarily of the non- 
Central-European ones25. If the latter is true, one ought to examine those 
circumstances (differences between pre-communist welfare traditions, the 
levels of communist welfare provision, and -  above all -  the strategies of 
post-communist economic and political transformation) that explain the 
relative softness of the “social crisis” in the ECE region. Otherwise, one 
cannot exclude that “neoliberal radicalism” may have contributed not only 
to the dismantling of old welfare arrangements but -  through stabilizing the 
economy and restarting growth -  also to the recovery of social transfers 
and services.26
3) was really generated by “neoliberal zealots”, “obsessed monetarists”, 
etc., or simply by ordinary economists who do have “social conscience” 
but can count as well. If the latter is true, their aim was not to suppress 
welfare spending for good but to adjust it realistically and temporarily to 
the overall performance of the economy, in other words, to cut back social 
expenditures now in order to raise them later on. Austerity was not a 
pretext for orchestrating a neoliberal conspiracy, so why would Latin- 
Americanization be inevitable? (By the way, is Chile not a Latin-American 
country?). True, adjustment is also tantamount to restructuring and 
streamlining but no one has claimed that East-Central Europe must jump 
over the West-European models of the welfare state.
4) is an accomplished fact that has been corroborated by reliable 
statistical analysis based on comparative longitudinal surveys made in the 




























































































fragmented statistics, expert estimates and a speculative blend of street- 
level observation, intuition, anecdotal evidence, opinion poll results and 
political discourse analysis. If the latter is true, one cannot tell whether or 
not the gloomy predictions will materialize. Moreover, these predictions 
may justify themselves: if politicians accept them in fear from social unrest 
and push up welfare expenditure, they may eventually destabilize the 
economy resulting in actual welfare cuts.
5) would be resolutely blocked by the citizens via more public spending 
or -  provided they are aware of the real costs of social expenditures they 
have to cover in the form of taxes and social security contributions -  the 
same citizens would opt for a “lower tax -  higher private insurance” 
alternative. If the latter is true and the citizens could be liberated from the 
prison of fiscal illusions27 concerning “free” social services and helped to 
recognize that the taxes are redistributed in a way that has not been in fact 
negotiated with them, then it will be difficult for many social-policy experts 
to refer incessantly to the people who yearn for a much greater protection 
by the state even if this results in some loss of their liberties. In any event, 
sociological surveys conducted in the region repeatedly show that the 
people are more inclined to individualist than collectivist values28.
Those who tell the “marking time” story are often too self-confident to ask such 
polite questions. Like their antagonists, they have deep-seated (and not 
completely unfounded) reservations about the other. In contrast to the accusation 
of “social negligence”, they discover in the minds of their adversaries a large 
dose of nostalgia with regard to the actual welfare achievements of communism. 
Apparently, they say, the others have forgotten that the “communist welfare 
state” was not only authoritarian and hypocritical but also monolithic and 
wasteful. In other words, it not only escaped democratic control and broke its 
own promises but also banned pluralism, that is, competition within the welfare 
sectors, and used resources lavishly.
Now, this inherent inefficiency of the Soviet-type welfare state had to a 
large degree contributed to the economic decomposition of the communist 
system. Why carry along that burden to post-communism?29 Why paralyze state 
budgets for many years to come? Why make false promises any longer? Why 
expect the early-born baby to be as strong as those who had the privilege to 
prepare for life for nine months? Quid pro quo: the trade-offs cannot be 
disregarded.30 Welfare expenditure competes with other sorts of public spending 
and originates in taxation. Hence, any restructuring in favor of welfare in the state 
budget or any rise in social spending may retard economic growth, generate 




























































































the way, they are unprotected), etc. -  thereby reducing, in the last analysis, the 
tax base of future social provisions. In this way, we can easily hurt those whom 
we wanted to help initially. Why would a fiscal crisis be better than a social 
one?31 Why not accept short-term hardships in order to avoid medium-term social 
chaos? In any case, at a certain point one has to deactivate the time bombs left 
behind by communism: during its last phases, welfare entitlements were 
simultaneously extended and compromised by falling standards of provision; this 
gap generated high expectations, and currently the citizens demand the new 
governments to comply with the obligations made by the old ones.
Furthermore, in East-Central Europe public welfare spending traditionally 
implies the empowerment of extremely costly, unprofessional and corrupted state 
and corporative bureaucracies. Health care is perhaps the best example not only 
for horror stories about service delivery but also for invulnerable vested interests 
of such bureaucracies (cf. empty hospital beds, idle personnel, repeated 
diagnoses, etc.)32. Privatization of the welfare sectors (or their pluralization in 
general) is not dictated by ideological fanatism. Like in the case of other public 
sector activities, the state administration inherited from communism must not be 
entrusted to carry out major welfare programs until it goes through the purgatory 
of market competition. Paradoxically, the welfare state should be rolled back in 
order to create efficient and clean public welfare again. Until then, it remains 
risky to offer the state administration the money of the taxpayers because it tends 
to expropriate and waste part of it and alter the rules of using the funds according 
to the changing exigencies of the political game.
Yet, if one casts a glance on comparative data, it comes as a surprise that 
a.) in the course of an unprecedentedly deep recession in the first half of the 
1990s, the ECE countries managed to increase public social expenditures relative 
to GDP; b.) they have introduced a couple of new welfare provisions 
(unemployment, child care) and did not abolish any from among the major social 
transfers and services of the former regime; c.) while reducing social spending in 
certain fields (price subsidies, social housing), they succeeded in maintaining 
(health care) or raising it in others (pensions, social assistance); d.) thus, what 
happened during the second half of the 1990s was closer to a stagnation than to a 
dramatic fall of the share of welfare expenditures; e.) in the course of the past ten 
years, East-Central Europe has undoubtedly descended from the level of 
Scandinavian welfare states in terms of the ratio of social spending to the GDP 
but has not yet reached the level of the less advanced OECD countries, not to 
mention that of the comparable middle-income countries in Asia and Latin- 
America (in which -  due mainly to differences between the pension systems -  the 
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marking time in the transformation of welfare regimes? There is, however, much 
-  less circumstantial -  evidence to support this thesis, say the narrators.
However, first a word of caution is needed.34 In the beginning, welfare 
spending might rise because certain kinds of public expenditure that had been put 
under different headings under communism (e.g., enterprise level social services) 
became parts of the social budget (local welfare provision). Further, it may well 
be that in absolute terms social provisions dropped with the GDP (though by and 
large, the 1989 levels have been reached by now), and probably more people 
compete for almost the same pool of public transfers and services than before. 
Hence, the average standards of public welfare provision fell in certain fields 
(unemployment benefit, social assistance) -  a reason for anxiety indeed. 
Nonetheless, even these falling standards are too high in relation to the economic 
potential of the ECE states. More importantly, the large drop in price subsidies of 
basic goods at the very outset of the transformation was offset by a surprising 
increase in public pensions and a less surprising rise of expenditure on social 
assistance. (Nota bene, medicine, rents, utilities, etc. have remained heavily 
subsidized until recently.)
Public spending on pensions, currently the largest item of social 
expenditure, grew primarily because the chances for claiming early retirement and 
qualifying for disability pensions have not been significantly constrained (cf. lax 
regulations, fraud and the aim of curtailing unemployment), and the new 
governments were eager to buy off the pensioners as voters35 with lucrative 
indexation techniques, growing pension-to-wage ratios and a slow increase of the 
unusually low retirement age. Similarly, in terms of family allowances, the policy­
makers could not help yielding to the nationalist/pro-natalist pressures also 
inherent in the communist tradition and did not scale back the main transfers in 
this field. (If they nonetheless tried to trim the provisions -  cf. the austerity 
package in Hungary in 1995 -  , they first bumped into social rights defended by 
the constitution, then into voters’ preferences.36) Also, enterprise-level social 
policy has not disappeared entirely: part of it was taken over by the new local 
authorities and private firms.
As regards social assistance, access to unemployment benefits has indeed 
been made more stringent as years passed, and the same applies to poor relief 
programs. Nevertheless, despite the fact that certain segments of the population 
suffer in many ways from economic transformation in general and the 
restructuring of welfare spending in particular, it would be too much to speak 
about overall impoverishment (let alone, pauperization) in the ECE region.37 Here 
poverty is rather shallow: the typical poor person is situated just under the 




































































































with the he ip of an upswing of the economy (and the trickle-down effect) he may 
leave the bottom of society rapidly before getting stuck in the underclass. The 
^Syndicators of social polarization in East-Central Europe are still well below those 
of the most egalitarian OECD countries.38
So much about (to put it euphemistically) the path-dependent performance 
of the new welfare arrangements. Now let us see whether time also stands still in 
the world of regime change. As far as universal free coverage is concerned, the 
targeting of provisions is not sharp and precise, means-testing remained an 
exception to the rule and co-payment is still minimal as compared to the market 
price. If these techniques have been introduced at all, they were loosened up soon 
afterward. Accordingly, the pension system, health care and family allowances 
(not to mention education) continued to be biased toward the well-to-do. The 
process of denationalizing the welfare sectors has proven to be protracted, partial 
and uneven (health care in the Czech Republic, pension schemes in Hungary); 
private insurance is under heavy state regulation; the share of non-public delivery 
and financing remained small and did not attain a critical mass within welfare 
activity as a whole.39
To sum up, welfare sectors in East-Central Europe belong to the few relics 
of command economy with all its dominant features such as overcentralization, 
waste, rationing, shortage, paternalism, rent seeking, corruption.40 Private/civic 
initiative still plays a minor role and freedom of choice is severely constrained. 
Under the pretext of the solidarity principle, excessive redistribution takes place, 
which favors the middle strata at least as much as those in need. The whole social 
system is non-transparent, complicated, full of exemptions and irregular 
procedures. It relies on a simplistic tax-and-spend philosophy (it is still a giant 
pay-as-you-go system with limited savings), which continues to breed free-riding 
(tax evasion). This in turn results in repeated tax increases, the aim of which is to 
keep the welfare promises embodied in untouchable but unaffordably broad 
entitlements. Higher taxes lead to an upsurge of parasitism -  a vicious circle that 
was already well known under late communism. As a consequence, self-reliant 
behavior cannot break through the routines of dependence culture; learned 
helplessness and “public protection from cradle to grave” type expectations 
prevail; the premature welfare state goes on debilitating its clients. It distributes 
alms instead of offering chances to work. Is this a residual welfare system? Those 
who constantly talk about the social costs of the transformation (and hardly 
mention its benefits)41 and panic about Americanization can sit back and relax; 
alarmism is needless. This is not yet a “market economy without adjectives”, to 
use the favorite term by Vaclav Klaus. As regards the social sectors, we are still 
flirting with a Third Road between communism and capitalism, which -  





























































































Let me continue with a personal note. Thus far, I did my best to reconstruct a 
dichotomy without the ulterior motive of comfortably situating myself at equal 
distance from the conflicting parties. Strangely enough, both of them are easy to 
support and reject as well. While occasionally my heart is close to the first 
narrative, my brain of an economist would rather agree with a moderate version 
of the second. The third story, which has virtually no past in the communist era, is 
understandably less coherent than the first two. Although it borrows from both of 
them it places itself outside their lasting controversy. It would be misleading to 
believe that this half-narrative differs from the others only in terms of a detached, 
deliberately non-normative interpretation of welfare history in the ECE countries 
over the last decade. The narrators of this “muddling through” story tend to 
scrutinize each and every small technical detail of the emerging welfare regimes 
pedantically. Thus, they have good chances to contribute to an image of social 
transformation in East-Central Europe, which is perhaps less spectacular but 
more realistic than the other two.
In essence, this pedantry rests on two pillars of evolutionary pragmatism:
Institutional inertia and the value o f incremental change.42 In contrast to the 
intense messages of the above narratives (“stop changing!”, “start changing”), 
nothing dramatic has happened: neither too much nor too little. It is equally futile 
to fear and to expect revolutionary changes or Grand Transformations. What has 
taken place, however, is a great variety of “small transformations” of key 
importance.43 A whole series of new organizations have been created for public 
management of welfare or for private/civic social provision both on central and 
local levels. Their interaction may result in strong institutional relations 
safeguarded by the rule of law as well as by new individual strategies and public 
awareness. At the same time, old institutions, no matter if they are embodied in 
organizations (ministries for social affairs, labor unions, hospitals) or in policies, 
routines, values, etc. (propensity for centralization, corruption, forced solidarity), 
may show immense resistance to reform. At any rate, gradualism would be 
desirable, even if it were not induced by institutional inertia, because of mounting 
uncertainty concerning the end-state of the transformation process: which model 
of the welfare states should East-Central Europe choose from the ever-changing 
Western menu? Welfare regimes are extremely complex institutions, 
experimentation is therefore no evil. One should be prepared for slow progress 
with stop-go cycles in the course of the trial and error procedure or sheer 
improvization. Minor moves, symbolic/creeping changes can accelerate, add up 




























































































For instance, symbolic changes such as even a partial renunciation of 
sacrosanct principles of the old regime (e.g., universalism, decommodification, 
all-encompassing solidarity) may prove to be a first push in the reorganization of 
the dominant philosophy of welfare policy. If the rearrangements within the 
public welfare budget (e.g., between price subsidies and social assistance, or 
central and local social services) or the moderate structural shifts between public 
and private initiative point in the same direction, and if these partial changes are 
synergetic and attain a critical mass, they may become comprehensive and 
irreversible. In this case, one may start considering whether or not a new welfare 
model is coming into being. Of course, we do not have to cry wolf all the time but 
it is worth while keeping our eyes open. For example, one need not launch a 
sweeping privatization drive in health care or the pension system in order to 
ensure that the former monolithic regime cannot return in its classical form. With 
the establishment of private insurance companies, new interest networks emerge, 
legal procedures and individual routines (long-term saving) build up, the whole 
capital market is bound to be reorganized, in other words, institutional guarantees 
gain strength, i f ..., if positive feedback mechanisms work. To make this happen, 
one must not shy away from piecemeal engineering or crafting, provided that 
eventually they do not force an over-ambitious master plan on the society.
Hybrid solutions and the "good state”. However, if the reform process does not 
happen to be self-generating for one reason or another, hybrid arrangements may 
appear on the welfare scene and stay there for a long time. Given the huge 
number of welfare subsystems in which reforms evolve with different pace, or 
even diametrically opposite changes take place45, hybridization with a great 
variety of intermediary solutions is very likely. It may produce, in a quite 
spontaneous manner, fairly original (re)combinations of welfare regime types. It 
would be too simple to assume that the welfare mix is a three-person game 
between the state, the market and the third sector. There are many more actors 
involved depending on the social prehistory of the country and the actual diversity 
of configurations of public regulation, private initiative and voluntary activity. 
Also, these actors can compete or cooperate in financing as well as in delivering 
welfare provisions, etc. Therefore, instead of continuing the secular debate on 
“state versus market”, i.e. on their eternal confrontation, we had better examine 
how these institutions mingle and merge (or conflict, if you wish) in various kinds 
of existing partnerships including also the non-profit sector. The devil is lurking 
in the details: the internal proportions of these intricate combinations should be 
identified and fine-tuned if necessary. Meanwhile, one should not refrain from 
endorsing state dominated welfare mixes, if the market fails and the government 




























































































If we revisit the past decade of East-Central Europe from this perspective, 
we will not see either a landslide marketization/privatization process in the social 
sphere or a relatively intact welfare state of communism. As a matter of fact, the 
state remained the main redistributor of welfare. However, private social 
spending began to rise, and in delivering welfare services, the state initiated “joint 
ventures” (e.g., outsourcing) with NGOs and private firms. The first Grand 
Design type institutional reforms in regulating pensions and health care are also 
cooperative projects of financing, in which public administration bargains with 
private and corporative actors about mixed governance. Even the state was 
divided into two: since the early 1990s, central administrations have had to face 
largely independent local authorities and cooperate with them as smoothly as 
possible. Social spending ceased to be decided upon behind the scenes within the 
confines of the communist party-state: instead, currently in every country of East- 
Central Europe there is an open struggle, in and outside the Parliament, for every 
penny of expenditure; a struggle ranging from negotiations between the political 
parties to forge nationwide social deals, through tripartite agreements, to wildcat 
strikes.47
As regards the emerging hybrids, public institutions of welfare often turn 
out to be superior to their non-governmental rivals in terms of efficiency or 
distributive justice or both.48 This is especially the case if the state gets a little 
help from the non-state organizations.49 It is well known that exclusively state-run 
social security is usually not flexible and rich enough to satisfy rapidly changing 
demand for protection, particularly, for high-quality protection whereas it obliges 
those who have these “extra” claims to be solidaristic with the “average” citizen. 
Private insurance may be a useful partner here. Yet, in health care or in 
unemployment protection, for example, the insurance market, if left alone, would 
“adversely select” and discriminate against exactly those (the poor, the sick, the 
unskilled) who badly need security. Also, moral hazard and third-party payment 
problems may arise and information is far from perfect. In these fields, the state is 
indispensable not only as a regulator and legal supervisor but also as a financing 
agent and a mass provider. Even universal schemes can be just and redistribution 
may be considered as a kind of insurance. Moreover, state spending on welfare 
can work as a classical stabilizer of the business cycle and -  like in the case of 
the Asian tigers -  a large part of social expenditure can be regarded as investment 
in future growth.
These two bundles of arguments are meant to support the final conclusion: 
East-Central European welfare regimes are muddling through to achieve some 
degree of normalcy measured by an average of Western standards. The 
destination is unclear, the transformers are uncertain, they are perhaps reactive 




























































































they only find second-best solutions. These are, however, much more viable and 
original than the allegedly first-best solutions implied by the first two narratives. 
Comprehensive social contracts have not been elaborated yet but there are a 
number of smaller or larger social deals in the making. This type of muddling 
through reminds the observer of groping rather than a steadfast pursuit of clear 
objectives. Actually, it is sometimes simply muddling along...
If I belonged to the group of the narrators of this story, I would suggest to 
modify part of the argumentation and add some new pillars to uphold the 
“muddling-through” hypothesis. First, I am afraid that their neutral position vis a 
vis the government needs more subtle evidence in the context of post­
communism. Today, in East-Central Europe, even a market which often fails may 
prove to be more efficient and fair in welfare policy than most intervention made 
by a corrupt, non-professional, corporatist, etc. state. Again, health care serves as 
an example of a horrendous government failure probably with the exception of 
certain domains of primary health service.
Secondly, the advent of parliamentary democracy in the region equally 
contributed to status-quo-oriented and transformative policies. Following an 
initial grace period, the new governments could not afford (even if they had 
wanted) to disregard the preferences of large constituencies for maintaining the 
level and the institutional guarantees of social safety. The temptation for delaying 
painful decisions about social transformation was great; the short ran costs of 
postponement competed with changing financial pressures;50 the end result was a 
series of ad hoc compromises attacking and defending “acquired rights” and 
“moral claims to entitlements”. At the same time, democracy and the rule of law 
promoted the establishment of new welfare institutions from labor unions to 
private kindergartens, and the introduction of new social policies from openly 
acknowledging poverty to granting free choice of medical doctor to the patients. 
Thus, both a neoliberal rush and a communist intransigence were relatively 
unlikely outcomes. This is to reinforce one of the pillars of the third story.
Unfortunately, however, it is easier to say that things are complicated than 
to state how complicated they really are. In fact, it is extremely hard to draw the 
balance of the contradictory developments primarily because it is almost 
impossible to measure what I would call “invisible welfare” provided by the new 
liberties. Interestingly enough, the analysts used to stress those social advantages, 
which stem from the collapse of the economy of shortage, from the new property 
rights and from the free entry to the market (end of queuing, consumer choice, 
enterpreneurial rights, etc.). After all, if one wants to counterbalance the 
pessimistic thesis of the vast psychological costs of the transformation (growing 




























































































etc.),51 there is a long list of additional advantages to quote: free (or less limited) 
travel, choice of workplace, residence, welfare mix, savings behavior, 
association; access to foreign medicine, to alternative (natural) treatment, 
protection of personality rights as patients, the opening up of the welfare facilities 
of the nomenklatura, public discussion of future social strategies, etc. Is it more 
humane to keep someone idle in a loss-making public firm or make him 
unemployed, retrain and assist him in finding a new job? Which sort of anxiety 
hurts deeper: the fear of losing one’s job for economic or political reasons? Ask 
someone who was saved by an emergency helicopter of an international 
charitable organization (a vehicle that had not been permitted to enter the airspace 
of the Warsaw Pact) whether his welfare did not increase thereby? I am 
convinced that these corollaries of new freedoms cannot be nonchalantly put 
under the heading of “formal opportunities that sometimes cannot be exploited 
even by the winners of the transformation”.
Owing to its “invisible” components, there must have been a considerable 
rise in welfare (which might also appear in tangible items like income and wealth) 
in the first stages of the transition, not to mention the medium and long-term 
social consequences of new liberties such as the improvement of health 
conditions or old-age security. Obviously, these improvements may be dwarfed 
by the deterioration of other components of welfare. But how do we know it?52 
Unless we are able to compare apples with pears, it requires a great dose of 
optimism to say that we are aware of the main patterns of the history of welfare 
regimes in the ECE region during the past ten years.
Thirdly, incommensurability is only one chapter in a large catalogue of 
problems related to statistical accounting, particularly in those fields in which the 
fiercest debates take place (size and character of poverty, social polarization, 
etc.).53 Let me mention one example, that of the shadow economy, which goes 
beyond the problem of statistics.54 Under and after communism, informal welfare 
activity in the extended family as well as reciprocal self-help relations between 
individuals and families and even semi-commercial transactions have included as 
diverse forms of in-kind or in-cash protection as day-care, care for the elderly, 
housing, health care, etc. Part of these activities were traditional and motivated by 
poverty and backwardness (home-made welfare). The other part was induced by 
the planned economy with all its friction and rigidity (shortages and the 
possibility of free riding by means of corruption). Meanwhile shortages partly 
evaporated, you are tempted to bribe those who have access to scarce goods less 
frequently, and free riding became increasingly geared by the purpose of tax 
evasion. If today we take into account every penny the citizens give the doctors 
as gratuity and every day the same citizens devote to repainting the vilagge clinic 




























































































or in the neighborhood for building a friend’s house, we may arrive at 20 to 40 
per cent of overall welfare spending, i.e., at figures representing the share of 
informal economy in the GDP in Poland and Hungary today. Or we may not, 
depending on the still non-existent statistical results. Has this unknown share of 
informal welfare grown or diminished over the past decade? If we intend to say 
something reliable about the performance of the social systems in East-Central 
Europe, we ought to know the answer. Similarly, in describing the welfare 
regimes in the region, even a 15 percent share of informal welfare is high enough 
to regard it as an important element of the welfare mix. Thus far, however, 
informal welfare is not less invisible than the social consequences of 
democratization. Yet, the relative strength of the informal social safety net could 
probably help us understand why the widely expected social explosion did not 
occur even in the less fortunate Eastern European countries.
Fourthly, in contrast to the other two narratives, which do not pay much 
attention to the country types, this one, which is really interested in intricacies of 
the social systems, ought to produce a classification scheme within the region55. 
Still, what we see is the usual exercise in attenuating Esping-Andersen’s general 
typology with no great erudition56. According to this, the region departed from the 
communist version of a Bismarckian conservative corporatist regime, which 
included some features of the social-democratic regime type. During the last 
couple of years, many of these Swedish-style features have been replaced with 
those of a liberal welfare regime. Ironically, any reference is lacking in the 
literature to the “Latin rim” countries with their “rudimentary welfare states” as a 
possible destination.57 No doubt about it, the reader may learn some interesting 
details about the corporatist role of Solidarity in social policy in Poland, the 
strength of social-democratic tradition in the Czech Republic or the large weight 
of informal welfare in Hungary. Nonetheless, a much deeper comparative analysis 
cannot be spared, I believe, if we consider seriously to respond to the “quo 
vadis" question in the not too distant future.
No Fatal Errors
If the third narrative is more or less correct, no fatal errors have been made in 
welfare policy yet. Paradoxically, this negative statement may improve the image 
of the EU candidate countries of the region in Brussels. The “communist welfare 
state” is being transformed but its relatively tightly knit safety net (including 
traditional protecting ropes) has not disappeared. At the same time, 
transformation is not excessive, the institutional experiments do not go much 
beyond their counterparts in Western Europe. The welfare regimes in the ECE 
countries have been instrumental in cushioning the blows of marketization and 




























































































mass migration or social dumping is to be expected, it is not the social systems of 
the would-be accession countries that should be blamed primarily. Unintendedly, 
these systems did a lot to keep the migrants at home and make the exported 
goods more expensive. If we look around in Eastern Europe as a whole, these are 
not negligible accomplishments.
As one of the Hungarian social policy experts whom I asked about the 
chances of EU accession in his field said to me with a cynical smile on his face: 
“If they do not want to take us, they will have to find a smarter pretext than our 
proud misery”. And he went on: “Ironically, in those fields of welfare in which 
Brussels is interested today, we are -  willy-nilly -  comparatively good, at least in 
formal terms and because the insiders cannot require much, due to the low level 
of social integration in the Union. Labor and social legislation, equal chances, 
social dialogue etc., are not too dangerous terrains. As far as safety and health at 
the workplace is concerned, we will be saved by the continuing decay of our 
greatest accident- and disease- producers, the large state-owned firms in coal 
mining, steel and chemical industries. During the past ten years, these firms have 
poured out hundred thousands of unemployed, impairing thereby the welfare 
reputation of the country. It is high time for us to see the sunny side of the 
collapse: less disabled persons, less pollution... Anyway, were the Greeks or the 
Portuguese ‘more social’ when they were chosen?”
To put it more seriously, the ECE region is currently facing four 
alternatives:
1) It will be enrolled in the EU in the near future without Brussels setting 
additional requirements in welfare policy to meet;
2) It will not be enrolled in the EU in the near future without Brussels 
setting additional requirements in welfare policy to meet;
3) It will be enrolled in the EU in the near future but as part of the 
prolonged entrance examination it has to fulfill additional requirements in 
welfare policy in the coming years;
4) It will not be enrolled in the EU in the near future but as part of the 
prolonged entrance examination it has to fulfill additional requirements in 
welfare policy in the coming years.
According to official statements made by the governments of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland recently, the year 2003 would be regarded by them as a date 
of near-term accession. Today, they do not seem to trust in the viability of the 
first alternative but they would certainly consider the second an acceptable 
solution if the date of accession did not come later than 2005. The same would 




























































































tough. Understandably, the fourth alternative would be seen in the region as a 
double tragedy because it would imply hard work without the promise of quick 
reward.
Currently, the region is preparing for one of the first two options. The local 
experts are pretty sure that the Union will not set new hurdles in the social sector 
either in terms of performance indicators or regime characteristics. To put it 
bluntly, they are convinced that no dramatic change would occur in the conditions 
of entrance if say, thousands of homeless people organized hunger-marches in 
Polish cities next Winter or in Hungary the entire social security system were 
privatized in the coming year. This prognosis is based on two pillars: a.) on the 
historical fact that indeed former entrants did not have to achieve predefined 
levels e.g., in poverty reduction or life expectancy on the one hand, and 
predefined proportions within their respective welfare mixes on the other; b.) on 
the assumption that, because of the diversity of welfare state types and their 
performances within the EU, Brussels lacks any ground of justification for 
introducing new requirements of convergence.
In closing, I would like to avoid evaluating that prognosis. That would be 
alien, I believe, to the general historical thrust of this chapter. However, given the 
above prognosis, it is quite another matter to understand what kinds of welfare 
reform initiatives are to be expected in the region in the near future.
In this field, the message sent by the Union to the candidate countries is 
twofold (or less euphemistically, inconsistent). On the rhetorical level, Brussels 
has not ceased to emphasize that Europe represents a unique social philosophy 
and quality on the globe, while on the pragmatic level, it has made it clear that the 
welfare status of the would-be members does not feature on the top of the list of 
enrollment criteria.58 To be sure, this ambiguity mobilizes routine coping 
strategies on the part of governments in ex-communist countries. Paying lip- 
service to a (foreign) dominant ideology while trying to do what they wanted/had 
to do (at home) anyway -  this is exactly what the governments in the region were 
trained for under Soviet rule. Their response is, therefore, preprogramed: it is an 
amalgam of avoiding to make spectacular mistakes on the surface and of pursuing 
autonomous policies at their own will as far as in-depth reforms (or the lack of 
these reforms) are concerned. In other words, home-made “path dependent”, 
“muddling through” style steps are more likely to come than courageous new 
initiatives urged by the EU. If nevertheless something new were to occur due to 
internal pressures, it would be camouflaged or belittled carefully. To return to the 
above examples, government agencies will pay attention to keeping the homeless 
in their shabby shelters and make efforts to sell privatization abroad under the 




























































































The ambiguity of the EU message reinforces these governments in then- 
own belief that there are no Grand Questions of principle in European matters of 
welfare. Many of the most important facets of social life are soft and negotiable. 
You may be weaker in welfare policy if you are stricter in introducing the 
Schengen rules or more advanced in environment protection, not to speak of 
market liberalization.
Maybe, things turn out to be much more simple, and the ECE governments 
will not have any major policy moves to embellish in the near future. The current 
administrations in the region do not seem to be prepared to launch welfare 
reforms which might make their Western European partners anxious. Recently, 
the Czech government has practically been paralysed by the semi-formal grand 
coalition. True, its predecessor also hesitated to restructure the pension schemes, 
kept unemployment at an artificially low level and compromised health care 
privatization by neglecting to protect the project from potential market failures.59 
In Poland, following a partial marketization of the pension system in 1999, the 
government will probably not risk introducing another reform program of high 
sensitivity, in particular, today, in a period of the country’s decreasing reputation 
in Brussels. Finally, in Hungary, marketization of health care has not yet reached 
the stage of a government proposal, while the already existing private pillar of the 
pension system has been weakened by the new administration. None of the 
governments in the region plan seriously to launch large-scale restructuring and/or 
privatization in the social sphere or in the state sector in general, which might 
lead to a -  probably, only temporary -  upsurge in unemployment, poverty, etc..
This may reassure the lucky half of Europe: migration pressures as well as 
social dumping are not going to increase during the next years. At the same time, 
sitting back would be risky. The current propensity of East-Central European 
governments to postpone economic and social reforms, in particular those, which 
are not being resolutely forced by the negotiators from Brussels (or are openly 
disliked by them), will backfire in all probability. Accelerating certain EU- 
consistent transformations means neglecting certain -  probably, more vital -  
regime changes in welfare. The lack of these changes, some of which would go 
beyond the current European models of social policy, could in turn slow down 
economic growth generated by the accession itself.
Admittedly, muddling through in the ECE region is not the fastest way of 
convergence between East and West. Nonetheless, it implies a trial and error 
process that takes place without major interruptions, though the experiments are 
limited, time-consuming and partly misguided. This process represents an idea of 
gradual and fragmented convergence of social systems; a kind of convergence 




























































































lead to a final dismantling of the “Social Curtain” in a couple of decades without 
a complete adjustment of the ECE welfare regimes to the Western European 
ones.
If, however, the interplay of reform compulsion and reform fatigue/aversion 
either slows down the transformation of welfare regimes in the region or -  
paradoxically -  speeds them up to attain full convergence measured by current 
European standards, then the accession may result in a lasting persistence of the 
social border -  now within Schengenland.
J â n o s  M â ty â s  K o v â c s





























































































1 F e r g e  e t  al ( 1 9 9 6 c ) ,  K o v â c s  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  (1 9 9 9 ) .
2 K o v â c s  (1 9 9 8 ) .
3 W ith  th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  th e  S O C O  S u r v e y  (F e r g e  e t  a l ( 1 9 9 6 c ) )  an d  th e  b o o k  b y  G ô tt in g  
( 1 9 9 8 ) ,  th e  p a p er s  b y  D e a c o n  ( 1 9 9 2 a ,b ) ,  K ram er  (1 9 9 7 ) ,  O ffe  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  N e ls o n  (1 9 9 7 )  and  
S ta n d in g  ( 1 9 9 6 )  are o n ly  p artia lly  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  and  c o m p a r a tiv e .
4 D e a c o n  (1 9 9 2 a ,b )  (1 9 9 3 ) ,  F e r g e  (1 9 9 5 )  ( 1 9 9 6 a ,c )  ( 1 9 9 7 a ,b ) ,  N e ls o n  ( 1 9 9 7 ) ,  S ta n d in g  (1 9 9 4 )
( 1 9 9 5 )  (1 9 9 6 ) .
5 G ô tt in g  ( 1 9 9 8 )  p p . 2 4 0 - 2 4 7 ,  R e in  at al ( 1 9 9 6 ) .
6 S z a la i (1 9 9 6 ) .
7 E sp in g -A n d e r s e n  (1 9 9 0 ) ,  T itm u ss  (1 9 7 4 ) ,  D e a c o n  ( 1 9 9 2 a ) ,  F e r g e  ( 1 9 9 2 )  ( 1 9 9 5 )  ( 1 9 9 7 b ) ,  
V e c e m ik  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  p p . 1 9 6 -9 7 .
8 S ta n d in g  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  p . 2 2 7 .
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